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NOTES
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES: BREAKING
THE CORPORATE RULE
The topic of successor products liability engenders much debate.'
Similarly, the case law and commentary concerning the availability of
punitive damages in the products liability context is exhaustive.2 Only a
handful of state courts, however, have addressed the issue of whether a
successor corporation3 may be liable for punitive damages.4
The few courts that have addressed this issue merely have extended
either of two theories of successor products liability, developed in the
context of compensatory damages, 5 to the growing number of punitive
damages claims:6 the continuity-of-enterprise theory7 and the product-
1. See infra notes 12-123 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 124-37 and accompanying text.
3. A purchasing entity qualifies as a "successor corporation" if it acquires all or substantially
all of the manufacturing assets of the selling entity. See Reed v. Armstrong Cork Co., 577 F. Supp.
246, 248 (E.D. Ark. 1983). A company that merely participates in a partial purchase of a dissolving
firm's assets upon bankruptcy liquidation, for example, would not trigger the various theories dis-
cussed in this Note. See infra notes 12, 13, and 114 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 138-86 and accompanying text.
5. Traditionally, compensatory damages were intended to compensate the injured party for
the injury sustained, and nothing more. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 7 (W.P. Keeton 5th ed.
1984). Today, however, compensatory damages have expanded to include a wide spectrum of actual
and ethereal injuries, including mental anguish, pain and suffering, loss of society, loss of consor-
tium, emotional trauma, and other metaphysical injuries. Id. at 54-66. This growth has led some
commentators to call for the abolition of punitive damages. Critics argue that punitive damages
overcompensate a plaintiff. See, e.g., Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should Be Abol-
ished, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE: THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES (D. Hirsch &
J. Pouros eds. 1969); Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37
VAND. L. REV. 1117 (1984). Cf Owen, Punitive Damages in the Products Liability Litigations, 74
MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1295-99 (1976) (punitive damages serve a compensatory function by reimburs-
ing plaintiff for the costs of the lawsuit).
6. In addition to compensatory damages, punitive, or exemplary, damages are assessed to pun-
ish a defendant who commits an aggravated or outrageous act of misconduct against a plaintiff and
to deter similar behavior in the future. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) & com-
ment a (1979). See also infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
Prior to 1976, jury awards for punitive damages in products liability cases had been upheld in only
three instances at the appellate level: Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975)
($100,000), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d
689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) ($250,000 as remitted by trial court); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill.
App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), aff'd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970) ($10,000). Today,
however, such awards are becoming the rule rather than the exception. See Moore v. Remington
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line theory.8 These theories represent two different means that courts
have adopted9 to achieve the same end-reconciling the inherent conflict
between the corporate law of acquisitions and tort-based products liabil-
ity law. The traditional corporate approach to successor liability seeks to
promote certainty at the point of the acquisition by eliminating responsi-
bility in the purchasing corporation (the successor) for the liabilities of
the purchased corporation (the predecessor). 10 This rule affords little
protection to the products liability plaintiff who purchases prior to the
corporate transaction, but whose claim may not arise until several years
after the transaction." The continuity theory affords relief to the inno-
Arms Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 1114, 427 N.E.2d 608, 616-17 (1982) ("[t]he tide has ... turned:
judgments for punitive damages are now routinely entered across the nation, and staggering sums
have been awarded"). For an exhaustive list of recent cases considering punitive damages in prod-
ucts liability cases, see Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. Ray. 1, 5 n.28 (1982).
7. Under the continuity-of-enterprise theory, the courts may find liability when there is con-
tinuity of management, business operations, and shareholders between the new and pre-existing cor-
porations. See infra notes 58-80 and accompanying text.
8. Under this theory, which relies upon principles of tort law, the successor coproration is
liable when it continues the product line of the predecessor. See infra notes 81-123 and accompany-
ing text.
9. Some courts have refused to alter the status quo's traditional corporate rule of liability
absent a legislative mandate. The Seventh Circuit has stated that
grave risks arise from court adoption of policy considerations to effect a change in a law so
fundamental to the interdependent economic segments of a complex society. Whether the
mounting costs of such change can be absorbed by insurance, whether product liability
costs may grow so high in one state as to encourage business emigration, whether the
relationship of workmen's compensation laws to product liability laws should be adjusted,
and whether the many other economic and social effects of such an exception can be justi-
fied, are questions difficult to answer by analysis of the facts of a particular case and, it
would appear, are more amenable to legislative investigation and determination.
Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 440.41 n.7 (7th Cir. 1977). See also Floram v. Elliott
Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989) (no legislative intent to abrogate traditional rule); Bernard v.
Kee Mfg. Co., 394 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1981) (declining to adopt product-line theory absent state
legislation).
10. See infra notes 12-23.
11. The pertinent statute of limitations will depend on the theory of plaintiff's claim. Products
liability actions fall into three categories: negligence, implied warranty, and strict liability. As con-
tract principles generally will govern an implied warranty claim, the statute begins to run at the
point of sale. See P. SHERMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER 275
(1981). Under a negligence or strict liability theory, the statute of limitations does not begin to run
until the injury occurs or manifests itself. Id. Thus, a manufacturer potentially could be liable 20,
30, or 40 years into the future. See, eg., Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128 (D.N.J.
1976) (injury occurred 53 years after manufacture). Some commentators have suggested implement-
ing a statute of repose. See Comment, Limiting Liability: Product Liability and a Statute of Repose,
32 BAYLOR L. REV. 137, 142 (1980). Under a statute of repose, the time within which a claim could
be brought would begin to run from either the date of manufacture or the date of sale rather than the
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cent plaintiff by allowing the exceptions to the traditional corporate rule
of nonliability; the product-line theory, on the other hand, provides relief
by relying on principles of tort law.
This Note examines the extension of the continuity and product-line
theories to impose punitive damages for products liability on a successor
corporation. Part I reviews the history and underlying policies of the
traditional corporate approach and its exceptions. Part II examines the
development of the product-line theory. Part III analyzes the added di-
mension punitive damages awards impose on the question of successor
liability, emphasizing the approaches used by the courts to impose liabil-
ity. Part IV concludes that neither the continuity-of-enterprise theory
nor the product-line theory justifies awarding punitive damages against a
successor corporation. Accordingly, Part IV proposes an alternative the-
ory of liability for punitive damages that properly focuses on the conduct
of the purchasing entity, rather than the nexus between the predecessor
and the successor.
I. THE TRADITIONAL CORPORATE APPROACH
Under the traditional corporate rule, a corporation that purchases the
assets of another corporation for casht2 does not succeed to the liabilities
date of injury. Id. at 143. The period is usually much longer than a statute of limitations. The
Uniform Products Liability Act, for example, recommends 12 years in the products liability context.
UNIF. PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT § 110(B).
12. Because the cash-for-assets transaction has created much controversy as well as the bulk of
products liability litigation, it serves as the focus of this Note. However, there are two other types of
acquisitions of which the reader should be aware: the statutory merger and the stock purchase trans-
action. A statutory merger requires the filing of statutorily prescribed documents and the exchange
of the assets of the target company for stock in the surviving enterprise. This form of acquisition
protects target shareholders in the form of voting and appraisal rights. However, the acquirer suc-
ceeds to all debts of the target, including unknown contingent tort liabilities. See, e.g., MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 76 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 906 (McKinney 1986).
In a stock purchase, the acquiring corporation purchases the target's stock rather than buying its
assets directly. If there are dissenting target shareholders, the buyer need only obtain a majority of
the stock and then execute a cash-out merger. In a cash-out merger, the minority shareholders must
tender their shares, their only remedy being the right to request an appraisal to determine the fair
value of the shares. Thus, the target becomes a wholly-owned subsidiary of the buyer. The parent-
subsidiary relationship shields the purchaser from liabilities, except to the extent of its stock hold-
ings. If creditors or future tort claimants deplete the assets of the target, the purchaser suffers only
to the extent that he has overpaid for the shares because he did not know of the bidder's liabilities
that he acquired with the shares. L. SOLOMON, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, MERGERS, AND DivEs-
TITURES § 70, at 480.7 (1983).
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of the acquired corporation. 3  Furthermore, the selling enterprise can
liquidate without provision for unknown contingent claims 14 and the for-
mer shareholders cannot later be charged with those claims except to the
extent of their liquidation distribution.15 Courts have developed four ex-
ceptions to this stringent rule as a means of protecting the rights of com-
mercial creditors1 6 and minority shareholders.17 Thus, the purchaser in
a cash-for-assets transfer may incur the liabilities of the transferor if one
of the following conditions is met: (1) the transaction amounts to a con-
solidation or merger (de facto merger exception);"8 (2) the purchasing
13. For a collection of cases invoking the general rule, see 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 7122, at 190 n.1 (1983).
14. R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISTIONSI095-1141 (1986).
State law requires only that known debts must either be paid or adequately provided for as a condi-
tion of dissolution. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1905 (Supp. 1990). In addition, most states have
postdissolution statutes that allow creditors to assert claims within a fixed period of time after the
company dissolves. However, the relatively short statutory period-usually two or three years-
provides virtually no protection to the products liability claimant whose claim may not arise for
several years. See, eg., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 105 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278
(Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 102 (West Supp. 1989).
15. Some commentators have argued that the corporate predecessor and its shareholders
should bear the risk of loss because they placed the product in the stream of commerce and directly
benefitted from the profits derived from the sale of the defective product. See, e.g., Aylward &
Aylward, Successor Liability for Defective Products-Misplaced Responsibility, 13 STETSON L. REV.
555 (1984). While this may be true on a theoretical level, most courts and commentators have
rejected the argument because it is impossible to implement on a practical level. First, no relief may
be available if the statutorily prescribed period has expired. See supra note 11. Second, identifying
and tracing funds to numerous shareholders may be an insurmountable task. See R. GILSON, supra
note 14, at 1125; Comment, Continuing Corporate Existence for Post Dissolution Claims: The Defec-
tive Products Dilemma, 13 PAC. L.J. 1227 (1982).
16. The rationale underlying the rule of nonliability is that the claims of ordinary business
creditors are ascertainable at the time of sale and are reflected accordingly in the purchase price.
Thus, commercial creditors are protected as long as consideration is adequate. See Note, Imposing
Strict Liability upon a Successor Corporation for the Defective Products of Its Corporate Predecessor:
Proposed Alternatives to the Product Line Theory of Liability, 23 B.C.L. REV. 1397, 1399 (1982)
[hereinafter Note, Proposed Alternatives]; Note, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Pol-
icy Analysis, 58 IND. L.J. 677, 683 (1983) [hereinafter Note, A Policy Analysis].
17. In a statutory merger, shareholders of both companies must approve the merger by a major-
ity vote and the selling shareholders are accorded appraisal rights. See supra note 12. In a cash-for-
assets transaction the selling shareholders lose these rights. Id. Often, the purchaser will purchase a
majority of the shares and then will instigate a cash-out merger with the sole purpose of eliminating
the minority shareholders who have no remedy but appraisal. Id. The de facto merger doctrine
developed in order to protect these rights. See Appelstein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp., 60 N.J.
Super. 333, 349-53, 159 A.2d 146, 155-56, aff'd mem., 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960) (finding
merger or consolidation in order to ensure dissenting shareholders their appraisal rights); R. GIL-
SON, supra note 14, at 1099-1109.
18. See infra notes 24-46 and accompanying text. A consolidation differs from a merger in that
both combining entities disappear, forming a completely new enterprise. L. SOLOMON, supra note
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corporation is a mere continuation' 9 of the seller (continuation excep-
tion); (3) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such
debts; or (4) the transaction is fraudulently executed for the purpose of
escaping liability.2" Despite the original purpose of these exceptions,
courts readily have applied them to the products liability arena in order
to protect innocent product users.2" For relevant purposes, a successor
will face strict liability22 for injuries caused by the predecessor's product
if either the de facto merger exception or the continuation exception
applies.2 3
A. De Facto Merger Doctrine
A formal statutory merger contemplates the absorption of one corpo-
ration into another with the former losing its existence as a separate cor-
porate entity.24  Corporate statutes require the surviving corporation to
succeed to all liabilities of the target.25
12, § 70, at 460-61. For the purpose of this Note, the distinction is not important because the essen-
tial element, that only one enterprise survives, is present in either case.
19. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977); Kloberdanz v. Joy
Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 820 (D. Colo. 1968).
21. See infra notes 24-80 and accompanying text.
22. Plaintiffs generally assert one of three theories in a products liability case: negligence,
breach of implied warranty, or strict liability. Because the first two theories are premised on conduct
at the time of manufacture and sale, they do not impose liability on a successor and are therefore
beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977)
(action premised on negligence); Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974)
(negligence action); Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 535 (D. Del. 1988) (breach of
implied warranty); Pattelli v. Questor Corp., No. 79-C33 11, slip op. (N.D. I11. Mar. 11, 1982) (im-
plied warranty).
23. For the purpose of this Note, the other two exceptions are not relevant. The third excep-
tion turns on the language of the contract or other agreement of sale and does not depend on the
form of the corporate acquisition. Compare Bouton v. Litton Indus., 423 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1970)
(finding an implied agreement to assume future tort claims) with Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F.
Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (finding no express or implied assumption of liability when contract
specifically excluded liability for transferor's torts).
The fourth exception, involving fraudulent transfers, rarely has been invoked in products liability
cases. The typical case arises when the sale was not made in good faith, as evidenced by inadequate
consideration. See Wolffv. Shreveport Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 138 La. 743, 70 So. 789 (1916)
(consideration of $1,000 deemed bad faith). Furthermore, this Note is premised on the notion of an
arm's length bargain in which the successor is "innocent" of any wrongdoing. The essence of the
successor liability problem is that one of two innocent parties, the successor corporation or the
plaintiff, must bear the burden of the predecessor's mistake. The dilemma disappears if one party is
in some way culpable.
24. See supra notes 12, 17.
25. See supra note 12.
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The parties can achieve substantially the same result without the statu-
torily imposed liability by varying the transaction's structure. For exam-
ple, in a purchase of assets, the consideration paid may consist of both
cash and stock,2 6 or the target company may continue to exist for a pe-
riod of time following the acquisition.27 To avoid unjust results in such
cases, 28 courts have developed a de facto merger doctrine, applying it
when the transaction sufficiently resembles a de jure merger.29 Courts
have also used the de facto merger doctrine to impose tort liability on the
successor.
30
The modem test for a de facto merger in the context of compensatory
damages first emerged in Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 3 1 a federal
diversity action decided under New Jersey law.32 The transaction in
Shannon, while labled a purchase of assets, closely resembled a statutory
merger-the consideration consisted only of stock and the target dis-
26. Cf. L. SOLOMON, supra note 12, § 74, at 655.2; infra note 33 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
28. For example unfairness lies in the treatment of minority shareholders of the purchasing
company. In a statutory merger under most states' corporate law, minority shareholders of both
participating companies receive appraisal rights and other protections from abusive tactics. See, e.g.,
MODEL .BUs. CORP. AcT § 13.02(a)(1) (1979) (giving shareholders of an involved corporation the
right to dissent and receive fair payment in the event of a formal merger); N.Y. BUSINESS CORP.
LAW § 910(a)(1)(A) (McKinney 1986) (same). Where the transaction is not a statutory merger,
only the seller's minority shareholders receive these protections. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 13.02(a)(3) (1979) (giving shareholders of a corporation selling all or substantially all of its assets
outside the regular course of business the right to dissent and receive fair payment); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 910(a)(1)(B) (McKinney 1986) (same). Thus, when the court finds a corporate acqui-
sition sufficiently similar to a merger, it can guarantee both groups of minority shareholders protec-
tion through the de facto merger doctrine. See generally Phillips, Product Line Continuity and
Successor Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 906, 909-10.
29. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 86 N.J. 332, 341, 431 A.2d 811, 815-16 (1981)
(describing the de facto merger exception). See generally Phillips, supra note 28, at 909-10.
30. See Aylward & Aylward, supra note 15, at 558.
31. 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
32. Id. at 798-99. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) requires federal courts in
diversity jurisdictions to apply state law. Thus, the choice-of-law principles of the forum state will
govern. Courts have adopted three approaches with respect to successor liability. In some states the
law of the place of incorporation governs the initial tort liability; the law of the forum state then
determines whether punitive damages are justified. Krull v. Celotex Corp., 611 F. Supp. 146 (N.D.
Ill. 1985). In other jurisdictions, the law of the state of incorporation determines whether a merger
has occurred and the law of the place where the tort occurred governs the consequences of the
merger. Brotherton v. Celotex Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 148, 439 A.2d 1337 (1985). Finally, in some
states, the law of the state whose tort law would otherwise govern decides all issues. Hanlon v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 599 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Iowa 1984). See generally Duca v. Raymark
Indus., No. 84-0587, slip. op. at 4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 1986).
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solved soon after the consummation of the deal.33 The court considered
four factors relevant to finding a de facto merger.3 4 First, the court re-
quired a continuity of stockholder interest.3 The court distinguished in
this respect a cash transaction from a stock transaction. In a cash
merger, the parties are "strangers before the sale and continue[] to re-
main strangers after the sale," while in a stock transaction, the share-
holders become a constituent part of the surviving entity.36 Although the
consideration in Shannon consisted exclusively of stock, other courts
have indicated that a combined stock/cash acquisition may constitute a
de facto merger if the stock element predominates.37
Second, the Shannon court gave considerable weight to the fact that
the acquired company ceased its ordinary business operations, liquidated,
and dissolved as soon as "legally and practically possible."' 38 The ration-
ale underlying this factor is that the successor deprives the creditor of a
remedy by causing the acquired manufacturer's dissolution.39  Subse-
quent decisions indicate that the amount of time before formal dissolu-
tion is not the sole consideration for this factor.' ° The Shannon court
mentioned, but did not elaborate on, two additional considerations. The
33. Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 799.
34. Id. at 801 (citing McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970)).
35. Id. at 801.
36. Id.
37. In McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1970), the acquiring corporation purchased assets of the target in exchange for $2 million in
cash and 5,500 shares of the purchaser's common stock. The McKee court concluded that no merger
occurred because the stock element was nominal relative to the total consideration. Id. at 567, 264
A.2d at 105. It is unclear, however, whether equal amounts of stock and cash would suffice or
whether the stock element must clearly predominate so that the cash element is nominal. Another
interesting aspect of this problem, which most courts overlook, is the proportion of the purchaser's
stock that the target company's shareholders acquire. If the amount of stock acquired is minimal,
the nexus between the two companies is arguably tenuous.
38. 379 F. Supp. at 801.
39. See Note, Proposed Alternatives, supra note 16, at 1402.
40. In Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 965 (1975), the court found a de facto merger even though the predecessor continued to exist
for 18 months after the transfer and four months after plaintiff's injury. Id. at 367-69. Defendant,
North American Rockwell (Rockwell), purchased substantially all of the assets of the predecessor,
Textile-Machine Works (TMW), including its name, in exchange for Rockwell stock one year before
plaintiffwas injured. Id. at 363. The Rockwell stock represented the sole asset ofTMW. Id. at 367-
69. The court deemed the stock valueless because TMW could not sell it on the open market.
Rather, TMW was required to distribute the Rockwell stock to its shareholders upon dissolution.
Id. The court concluded that the predecessor was a mere shell because it was contractually bound to
dissolve, it had ceased doing business, and its assets were insubstantial. Id. at 367-69.
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court first looked for evidence of a nexus between the purchasing and
selling entities beyond common shareholders.41 Such evidence might in-
clude the continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets,
and general business operations.42 The court also considered the extent
to which the acquiring corporation assumed the liabilities and obligations
necessary to the normal operation of the acquired business. 3 The court's
discussion of these two factors suggests that a clear nexus between the
purchaser and the acquirer as well as assumption of liabilities further
would support a finding of a de facto merger.'
The Shannon opinion indicates that public policy concerns support the
four-prong test for finding a de facto merger.45 In particular, the court
noted that a purchaser who receives the benefits of a going concern must
also assume the costs ordinarily borne by the going concern.46
B. Mere Continuation Exception
Another path courts use to find successor liability despite the tradi-
tional corporate approach is the mere continuation exception. This ex-
ception requires continuity of management, business operations, and
shareholders in an existing or newly created corporation.47 Unlike a
merger, which by definition involves two corporate entities, 48 the mere
continuation exception can encompass a change in ownership in a single
enterprise.49
In Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.,1° plaintiff brought suit to recover for an
injury caused by a machine manufactured by B. Offen & Co., a sole pro-




45. 379 F. Supp. at 802. Accord Knapp, 506 F.2d at 369.
46. 379 F. Supp. at 802. According to the court, such a rule would not impose "artificial
restraints" upon corporations. Id. Rather, it merely forces the buyer and seller to adjust the sale
price to reflect potential liability. Id.
47. See, e-g., Knapp, 506 F.2d at 367-69; Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d
621 (7th Cir. 1971); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968). See generally
Note, Proposed Alternatives, supra note 16; Note, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate
,4sset Transferees-An Assault on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 600-01 (1977); Com-
ment, Expanding the Products Liability of Successor Corporations, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1305, 1315
(1976).
48. See supra note 12.
49. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. But cf. Lemire v. Garrard Drugs, 95 Mich.
App. 520, 291 N.W.2d 103 (1980) (rejecting cotitinuity test where predecessor was sole proprietor).
50. 501 F.2d 1145 (lst Cir. 1974).
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prietorship. Upon the sole proprietor's death, a group of key employees
purchased the proprietor's interest and continued the business in the
same manner and under the same name. 1 The court found that the cor-
poration through which the employees operated the company had merely
donned a "new hat," and held the successor liable. 2
For all practical purposes, the de facto merger and mere continuation
exceptions are nearly indistinguishable. Under the continuation excep-
tion, courts essentially rely on the de facto merger elements, particularly
emphasizing the commonality of shareholder interest. 3 Because courts
effectively have blurred the distinction between the de facto merger and
mere continuation exceptions, either label might reach the same result on
the same facts.
Although the results under both tests are often identical,5 4 the Cyr
court's rationale notably differs from the Shannon court's reasoning.
Whereas the Shannon court relied on corporate law principles to support
a finding of successor liability,55 the First Circuit in Cyr supported its
decision by reference to the four traditional tort justifications for strict
products liability: (1) the manufacturer is better able to bear the costs
than is the consumer; (2) the manufacturer placed the product in the
stream of commerce; (3) the manufacturer implicitly represented the
product's safety by placing it in commerce; and (4) the manufacturer
51. Id. at 1151. Employees purchased 70% of the stock and an outside financier purchased the
remaining 30%. Id. Because the consideration was necessarily cash (as the purchasers had no stock
to give), the court in Cyr actually adopted the expanded continuity approach of Turner v. Bitumi-
nous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976), discussed infra notes 58-80 and accom-
panying text.
52. Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1151.
53. See, eg., Green v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 122 Ill. App. 3d 204, 460 N.E.2d 895
(1984) (merger exception is inseparable from continuation exception); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 86
N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981) (if commonality of management or ownership cannot be shown, there
is no continuation of the seller's enterprise).
54. See Green, 122 Ill. App. 3d 204, 460 N.E.2d 895 (merger exception and continuation excep-
tion inseparable). Other courts found neither the merger nor the continuation exception applicable.
See Travis v. Harris, 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977); Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th
Cir. 1977) (no carryover of management or owners, so no exception found); Domine v. Fulton Iron
Works, 76 Il1. App. 3d 253, 395 N.E.2d 19 (1979) (no exception where purchasing corporation
purchased only some assets of selling corporation which continues under another name); Hamaker v.
Kenwel-Jackson Mach., 387 N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986) (no exception where no stock in successor
transferred, no management carryover, and business development in different direction); Fish v.
Amsted, 126 Wis. 2d 293, 376 N.W.2d 820 (1985) (no exception if key elements of commonality of
officers, directors and shareholders not found).
55. See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
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stands in the best position to improve the product's quality.5 6 The Cyr
court concluded that the first and fourth rationales applied with equal
force to a successor corporation because the successor inherits the experi-
ence and expertise of the original manufacturer.57
C. The Expanded Continuity-of-Enterprise Theory
In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.,5  the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan substantially expanded the de facto merger and continuation excep-
tions by eliminating the continuity-of-ownership requirement."9 The
plaintiff in Turner sought to recover for an injury caused by a power
press manufactured by T.W. & C.B. Sheridan Company (Old Sheri-
dan).' After the sale of the press, but prior to the accident, Harris Inter-
type Corporation (Harris) purchased the entire business, goodwill, name,
and assets of Old Sheridan for cash.6" Harris set up a subsidiary (New
Sheridan) to accept the assets of Old Sheridan.62 Old Sheridan dissolved
four days after the parties consummated the deal, and New Sheridan re-
mained a wholly owned subsidiary of Harris.63 Several years later, New
Sheridan formally merged with and became a division of Harris." The
trial court declined to hold Harris or New Sheridan liable for the defec-
tive power press because neither party manufactured, sold, or distributed
the product.65
The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed, relying on both the con-
tinuity factors enunciated in Shannon 6 6 and the strict liability principles
set forth in Cyr.67 First, the Turner court distinguished Shannon, noting
the absence of stock as consideration.6" The court, however, did not find
56. Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1154. See P. KEETON, R. KEETON, L. SARGENTICH & H. STEINER, TORT
AND ACCIDENT LAW 555-63 (2d ed. 1983).
57. 501 F.2d at 1154.
58. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
59. Id. at 413, 244 N.W.2d at 880.
60. Id. at 408, 244 N.W.2d at 875.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 408, 244 N.W.2d at 875-76.
64. Id. at 408, 244 N.W.2d at 876.
65. Id. at 409, 244 N.W.2d at 876. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment. Id. The court of appeals denied leave of appeal and the supreme court granted leave. Id.
66. 397 Mich. at 420-24, 244 N.W. 2d at 879-80. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying
text.
67. 397 Mich. at 417, 244 N.W.2d at 884. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
68. 397 Mich. at 413, 244 N.W.2d at 879-80. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text
(discussing the Shannon court's concentration on stockholder continuity).
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the absence of stock dispositive when the remaining three factors are
present. 69 The court reasoned that, because the target shareholders' pro-
portionate share in the successor is often small, commonality of share-
holders may be minimal.70 Furthermore, the court noted that the actual
owners at the time of manufacture may differ substantially from those at
the time of sale of the assets. 1 Finally, according to the Turner court, if
the original manufacturer no longer exists, the plaintiff has no remedy,
regardless of the form of the acquisition.72
Relying on the First Circuit's opinion in Cyr,7" the Turner court ana-
lyzed successor liability in light of the four traditional justifications for
strict liability.74 The court noted that "[t]his is a products liability case
first and foremost."75 Similar to the First Circuit, the Turner court
found that the successor is the best cost-bearer76 and is the only entity
69. 397 Mich. at 416, 244 N.W.2d at 883. The court provided several reasons to support its
conclusion. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. But the court arguably overlooked the
most persuasive rationale for eliminating stock ownership in the products liability context: the dif-
ferent needs for protection of minority shareholders and tort claimants. See R. GILSON, supra note
14, at 1100; Phillips, supra note 28, at 912-14. One judge described the fundamental differences
between the parties:
Although a transaction should be scrutinized to protect both shareholders and tort claim-
ants, a court should search for somewhat different attributes of merger for purposes of
imposing liability. This difference in relevant attributes stems from the distinct relation-
ships to the corporation of the persons whom the legislature has sought to protect. While
dissenting shareholders need protection against alteration of their investment rights, tort
claimants need protection against attempts by ongoing businesses to avoid liability through
transfer of their operations to another legal entity.
Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 371 (3d Cir. 1974) (Rosen, J., concurring).
Thus, in the context of appraisal rights and other merger protections, the shareholder should have
the opportunity to terminate his investment and obtain the value of his shares whenever a merger
alters the fundamental relationship among the shareholders or between the shareholder and the
corporation. See Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427,433, 143 A.2d 25, 29 (1958). The de facto
merger doctrine achieves this goal by extending appraisal rights to shareholders of both the selling
and buying entities. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. The need for shareholder con-
tinuity is not apparent in the products liability context. See Phillips, supra note 28, at 914.
70. 397 Mich. at 413, 244 N.W.2d at 880.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 412, 244 N.W.2d at 878. The court also noted that the form of the acquisition is
irrelevant from the perspective of the purchasing corporation as well as the plaintiff. Id. Once the
selling corporation disappears, the successor loses its only source of indemnity, regardless of the
label affixed to the original transaction. Id. This observation, however, appears to circumvent the
issue at hand. If the successor corporation does not incur liability, the right to indemnification never
arises.
73. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
74. 397 Mich. at 425, 244 N.W.2d at 881.
75. Id. at 416, 244 N.W.2d at 877.
76. Id. at 425, 244 N.W.2d at 881.
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capable of improving the product.77 Thus, the Turner court imposed lia-
bility even though two of the criteria were not satisfied: the successor
neither launched the product into the stream of commerce nor made any
representation of safety.7" Despite this reliance on products liability
principles, the Turner court, like the Shannon court,79 structured its
opinion as an exception to corporate law principles. The tort principles
announced in Cyr thus served merely as policy justifications for modify-
ing the Shannon continuity test.80
II. THE PRODUCT-LINE APPROACH
A. Ray v. Alad and Strict Tort Liability
In Ray v. Alad,81 the Supreme Court of California abandoned corpo-
rate law principles and adopted an approach predicated solely upon strict
tort liability.8 2 Under the product-line theory set forth in Alad, the suc-
cessor is liable if it continues the involved product line of the predecessor,
regardless of the form of the corporate acquisition. 3 The product-line
theory responds to two primary criticisms of the traditional corporate
77. Id.
78. Id. Some commentators have suggested that, although the condition of the product is the
essential focus in strict liability, the manufacturer is "culpable" to the extent that it placed the
product in the stream of commerce and represented it to be safe. See infra notes 134-35 and accom-
panying text. The court in Turner glossed over these two elements in concluding that the successor's
exploitation of accumulated goodwill and outward manifestations of continuity suffice. 397 Mich. at
425, 244 N.W.2d. at 881.
One commentator contends that Turner's expanded continuity theory does not fulfill the deter-
rence function of strict liability. See Note, A Policy Analysis, supra note 16, at 701. Turner instead
rests solely on the cost-spreading rationale. Id. at 695. The author concludes that if cost spreading
is the only goal of successor liability, a form of social insurance would provide a more efficient
solution. Id. Similarly, the court in Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817, 820 (E.D.
Tenn. 1978) suggested that industry-wide liability would provide a more efficient means of fostering
the policies of successor liability.
79. Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 801. See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
80. The court made clear that it was proposing an expanded version of the traditional corporate
rule, rather than a new theory based solely on tort principles. According to the court, "[c]ontinuity
is the purpose, continuity is the watch word, continuity is the fact." 397 Mich. at 426, 244 N.W.2d
at 882. In addition to the usual requirements of internal continuity-products, management, per-
sonnel, etc.-the court stressed external continuity. The court stated that "fj]ustice would be of-
fended if a corporation which holds itself out as a particular company for the purpose of sales, would
not be estopped from denying that it is that company for the purpose of determining products liabil-
ity." Id. For a criticism of this holding-out aspect of Turner, see Phillips, supra note 28, at 919-20,
81. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1974).
82. Id. at 25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
83. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
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approach. First, the rigid corporate rule and exceptions overemphasize
the form of the acquisition, rather than concentrating on the transac-
tion's substance or practical effect. 4 The stock/cash distinction of the de
facto merger exception85 represents one example of this shortcoming.86
Second, the narrow scope of liability under the corporate approach does
not fulfill the primary goal of products liability-protecting the innocent
product user.8 7
In A lad, the defendant (Alad II) purchased the assets of its predecessor
(Alad I) for cash.88 These assets included the inventory, plant, equip-
ment, designs, and all rights to the trade name and goodwill of Alad 1.89
Alad II continued to manufacture the same line of ladders under the
Alad name, employed the same factory personnel, and solicited custom-
ers through the same sales representatives.9" The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia first determined that these facts triggered neither the de facto
merger nor the continuation exceptions.91 The court further noted that a
rule of nonliability promoted the free availability and transferability of
capital.92 Nevertheless, the Alad court concluded that protection of the
injured product user outweighed any advantages of nonliability and thus
84. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 86 N.J. 332, 336, 431 A.2d 811, 816 (1981) (narrow
application of the traditional rule is "inconsistent with the developing principles of strict liability and
unresponsive to the interests of persons injured by defective products").
85. See supra notes 18, 26-29, 35-37 and accompanying text.
86. Once one presumes that strict liability rules in the products liability context developed to
protect the innocent purchaser without regard to the manufacturer's culpability, it appears inconsis-
tent to make recovery in a successor liability case turn on whether cash or stock was paid in the
unrelated corporate acquisition.
87. See, e.g., Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76 Ill. App. 3d 253, 258, 395 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979).
88. 19 Cal. 3d at 24, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576. Plaintiff alleged that he fell from a
defective ladder in the laundry room of the University of California at Los Angeles. Thus, he also
named the University of California Regents as defendants based on their control of the laundry room
and the ladder.
89. Id. The sale did not include Alad I's cash, receivables, unexpired insurance, or prepaid
expenses.
90. Id. at 25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577. The court emphasized that there were no
outward manifestations of a change in management on printed materials except for a redesign of the
company logo on letterheads and labels. Representatives were not instructed to notify customers of
the changes. Id. See also Korzetz v. Amsted Indus., 472 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (empha-
sizing that the "world of the marketplace continued to see and rely on the [predecessor's] name").
91. 19 Cal. 3d at 28, 560 P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578. The acquisition did not constitute a
merger because of the cash consideration. Moreover, the mere continuation exception did not apply
because none of the retained individuals were officers, directors, or stockholders, even though Alad
II hired several Alad I employees at the production level.
92. Id. at 25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
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adopted a new exception.93
The Alad court provided three justifications for holding the successor
corporation strictly liable. First, the court recognized that the acquisi-
tion and subsequent dissolution of Alad I effectively destroyed the plain-
tiff's remedies against the original manufacturer.9" The court noted the
practical difficulties of tracing funds to former stockholders and direc-
tors95 and suggested that Alad I's insurance would not cover postacquisi-
tion injuries."
The Alad court also found that Alad II was equally capable of estimat-
ing the risks of future tort claims and obtaining insurance as the original
manufacturer. 97 Alad II had access to various resources, including man-
ufacturing designs, the continued employment of factory personnel, and
the consulting services of Alad I's former general manager.
Finally, the court reasoned that a successor who takes the benefit of
goodwill also must bear the burden of any ensuing "bad will." 98 The
93. Id. In carving out a tort exception to the general principles of successor liability, the court
drew an analogy to labor law. In the labor context, the United States Supreme Court refused to give
controlling weight to the form of the acquisition if such an application contravened the underlying
policies of the labor law. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 257 (1974);
Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n.5 (1973).
94. 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
95. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
96. 19 Cal. 3d at 32, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581. The trial record did not disclose
whether Alad I was insured. Id. Most products liability insurance policies, however, cover acci-
dents on an "occurrence basis." Note, A Policy Analysis, supra note 16, at 686 n.64. Only injuries
occurring during the policy period, rather than those caused by products manufactured during the
policy period, are covered. Id. Thus, Alad I's insurance would not cover postacquisition injuries.
97. 19 Cal. 3d at 33, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581. Arguably, both the original manu-
facturer and the successor face the same problems inherent in this area of insurance. First, insurers
generally write short-term policies of approximately two years, but retain the option of increasing
the premium or dropping the policy altogether at that time. Note, A Policy Analysis, supra note 16,
at 686 n.64. Furthermore, because products liability insurance rates are set on a countrywide basis
(unlike medical malpractice, automobile, and other standard lines of liability), either party faces the
risk of an across-the-board increase in premiums. For example, between 1970 and 1977, the average
increase in products liability insurance was 944.6%. Id.
However, the successor does bear any additional risks that are specific to its company. The na-
ture of its business may preclude it completely from obtaining insurance. Approximately 21.6% of
businesses seeking insurance were unable to obtain it at any price. Products Liability Insurance:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital Investment and Business Opportunities of the House
Comm. on Small Businesses, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977).
98. 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581. The court also suggested that
imposition of successor liability precluded the predecessor from obtaining a windfall in the form of
an enhanced purchase price. One commentator has coined the term "internalization" to describe
this rationale. See R. GILSON, supra note 14, at 1125. The internalization theory assumes that the
parties are in an equal bargaining position. If this assumption is met, then it makes no difference
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court noted that Alad II had held itself out to potential customers as the
same enterprise as its predecessor. 99 Allowing successor liability not
only equitably balances the successor's gain from the predecessor's good-
will, it prevents the predecessor from realizing a windfall."°° Thus, the
Alad court effectively denied the successor corporation a better position
than its predecessor.
B. Reaction to Alad
L Courts Adopting the Alad Doctrine
Most courts have been reluctant to follow California's lead."1 In fact,
only New Jersey, 2 Pennsylvania, 10 3 and Washington" ° have expressly
adopted Alad's landmark rule.
The Alad court's failure to define clearly the boundaries of its product-
line doctrine may have provided subsequent courts the impetus to inter-
pret the doctrine broadly. 05  In Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp.,10 6 the
upon which party liability is imposed because the parties will reallocate the burden by contract in the
most efficient way. This theory, when taken to its ultimate conclusion, leads to absolute successor
liability, a position that no court has embraced.
99. 19 Cal. 3d at 30, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
100. Id. The California court envisioned the windfall arising from a finding of nonliability for
two reasons: the reflection of this absence of liability in the purchase price of the company, and the
benefit to the dissolved predecessor of no subsequent responsibility for its defective products. Id.
101. See infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
102. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
103. Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa. Super. 15, 17, 434 A.2d 106, 109 (1981).
104. Hall v. Armstrong, 103 Wash. 2d 258, 260, 692 P.2d 787, 791 (1984).
105. The court purported to limit its holding to the "circumstances... presented." 19 Cal. 3d at
34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582. Because the relevant facts in Turner and Alad are identi-
cal, some commentators have suggested that the opinion can be construed as requiring the Turner
continuity factors in addition to product-line continuity. See, e.g., Note, A Policy Analysis, supra
note 16, at 680 n.25. This position is clearly erroneous. The product-line approach seeks to expand
the available remedies for the injured plaintiff, not add another obstacle to recovery. See Alad, 19
Cal. 3d at 28-29, 560 P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578 ("If [the continuity or de facto merger excep-
tions] were determinative of Alad II's liability to plaintiff it would require us to affirm the summary
judgment [for defendant]."). See also Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981)
(construing Alad to require only product-line continuity and not the enterprise continuity of
Turner).
106. 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981). The acquisition in Nieves involved the Old Sheridan-
Harris/New Sheridan transaction discussed in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406,
244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). See supra notes 60-64. Prior to the injury in Nieves, however, Harris sold
the assets and goodwill relating to the press line to Bruno-Sherman. These assets included historical
data, business records, customer correspondence, trade secrets, designs, and equipment. Bruno used
its own plant to continue production. Harris continued a different product line. Id. at 366, 431 A.2d
at 829.
Washington University Open Scholarship
354 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 68:339
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the product-line rule encompasses
all viable intermediate successors, not just the current producer.1 0 7 As
the New Jersey court reasoned, the Alad court "was concerned not as
much with the availability of one particular viable successor as it was
with the unavailability of the original manufacturer by reason of its di-
vesture of assets and dissolution."' 0 The court reached this conclusion
despite an indemnification agreement between the two successor corpora-
tions, contending that it was incumbent upon the defendant successors to
allocate the liability between themselves. 109
The California Court of Appeals expanded Alad's product-line theory
in Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc. '10 In that case, the court invoked the
product-line theory against a successor who never manufactured or dis-
tributed the product line that caused the injury, but continued the same
general line of business.1 11 The Rawlings court emphasized that the suc-
cessor enjoyed the effect of its predecessor's goodwill and trade name on
its remaining products. 12 in Savini v. Kent Machine Works,1 13 however,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
refused to hold liable a defendant corporation that purchased its prede-
107. Id.
108. Id. at 370, 431 A.2d at 831. The Nieves court found that the intermediate successor, Harris,
played an integral role in destroying plaintiff's remedy against the original manufacturer. Thus,
Harris should not escape liability merely because the injury did not occur while Harris was manufac-
turing the product.
109. Id. at 371, 431 A.2d at 832. This rule comports with traditional contract principles, which
provide that an indemnification agreement is binding only upon the parties thereto. Therefore, the
rights of the product user, a nonparty to the contract, cannot be affected.
110. 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). Plaintiff in Rawlings was
injured by a kelp dryer. The dryer was custom made to the purchaser's specifications by Warren
Industrial Sheet Metal. Id. at 894, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 120. Defendant, David Oliver, purchased the
assets and goodwill of the business; however, the original owners retained the land and buildings,
granting Oliver only a leasehold interest. Id. at 898, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
111. Id. at 896-97, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22. Oliver claimed that, while he used his predecessor's
name and carried on the business in the same manner, he discontinued any custom-made orders,
such as the one causing the injury. Id. at 898, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 121. Accepting these facts argu-
endo, the court nevertheless found liability based on Alad. Id. at 899-902, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 123-25.
But see George v. Parke-Davis, 107 Wash. 2d 584, 733 P.2d 507 (1987) (plaintiff not required to rely
on product-line rule in order to recover).
112. Rawlings, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 897, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25. See also Gee v. Tenneco, Inc.,
615 F.2d 857, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1980) (absent Alad's fundamental requirement that successor receive
benefit of continuation of predecessor's business and goodwill, it is unfair to impose successor
liability).
113. 525 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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cessor's trade name and goodwill, but few of the predecessor's assets.' 14
The defendant sold a different type of product, using only the original
trade name.115 Thus, continuation of the predecessor's business and en-
joyment of its goodwill are significant elements under the product-line
theory, although neither factor standing alone is dispositive.
2. Courts Rejecting the Theory
Courts in at least fifteen states have expressly rejected the product-line
theory,1 16 questioning the three policy rationales enunciated in A lad.' 7
They reason that the predecessor derived the benefit of profits from the
sale of the defective goods. 18 When a product proves defective after the
successor has purchased the assets, trade name, and goodwill of its pred-
ecessor, the successor is deprived of the only benefit of its bargain-the
predecessor's goodwill.' 19 Consequently, the seller receives a windfall
because the purchase price at the time of the acquisition did not reflect
114. Id. at 721-22. The assets purchased by the successor included blueprint and file cabinets, a
gear cutter, machine parts, and a set of old rolls. Id. at 714.
115. The defendant substituted different ink rolls for those produced by the defendant under the
trade name. Id. at 714. The court limited the product-line exception to cases in which the successor
corporation acquires "all or substantially all the manufacturing assets... and undertakes essentially
the same manufacturing operation." Id. at 721-22 (citations omitted).
116. Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 579 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Colorado law); Page v.
Gulf Oil Co., 812 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying Louisiana law); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co.,
645 F.2d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Missouri law); Rhynes v. Branick Mfg. Corp., 629 F.2d
409, 410 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Texas law); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 448 (7th Cir.
1977) (applying Ohio and Indiana law); Andrew's v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781, 785
(Ala. 1979); Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 394 So. 2d 552, 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Green v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 122 Ill. App. 3d 204, 460 N.E.2d 895, 900-01 (1984); De Lapp v.
Xtraman, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 219 (Iowa 1987); Niccum v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 43 N.W.2d 96 (Minn.
1989); Simoneau v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 130 N.H. 466, 469-70, 543 A.2d 407, 407 (1988); Ha-
maker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., 387 N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 144
Vt. 305, 308, 479 A.2d 126, 127 (1984); Fish v. Amsted Indus., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 310, 376 N.W.2d
820, 821 (1985).
117. Ray v. Alad, 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1974). See supra notes 81-100
and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Florem v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565
F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977).
119. Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Tenn. 1978). In Woody, defend-
ant purchased the assets of one of several divisions of the predecessor, Keasby & Mattison Co.
(Keasby), including its goodwill and trade name. Id. at 819. More than one corporation purchased
the Keasby goodwill and trade name. Defendant used the name for one year. Id. The court rejected
the product-line theory, reasoning that the successor lost the primary benefit of its bargain. Id. at
821. Because it could derive no benefit from past sales, Keasby's reputation constituted the primary
consideration for the bargain. Id.
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the seller's unknown liabilities. 120
Furthermore, courts rejecting the product-line theory contend that, in
addition to the cost-spreading function, another goal of strict liability is
to encourage manufacturers to take greater care in designing, manufac-
turing, and marketing products. 12 ' To support their view, these courts
cite traditional strict liability principles, which hold only members of the
original marketing chain liable.122 Finally, critics of the product-line the-
ory conclude that a plaintiff's lack of an alternative remedy does not, by
itself, justify sucessor liability; rather, it merely constitutes a "restate-
ment of the problem." 123
III. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. History of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages awards pervade the modem tort system, 24 despite
the erosion of their historical antecedents,1 25 their alleged infringement
120. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. Additionally, the original manufacturer
would be unjustly enriched to the extent that it failed to incorporate the costs of safety procedures
and research into the price of its product. Thus, a reckless manufacturer may be able to gain an
unfair advantage over its more socially responsible competitors. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594
P.2d 38, 47 (Alaska 1979), cert denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
121. Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Tenn. 1973). Accordingly, the Woody
court held that a successor, who had no ability to monitor or improve the product's safety during
manufacturing, could not be held responsible for the predecessor's defective product. 463 F. Supp,
at 821.
122. The successor, who did not create the risk of harm and who made no representation of
safety to the public, clearly does not come within the scope of the rule. Advocates of the product-
line theory, however, concede this point. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
123. See, eg., Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 581 (10th Cir. 1989) (lack of remedy for
plaintiff no answer to question whether state law should adopt product-line exception).
124. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7-15 (5th ed. 1984).
125. The doctrine of punitive damages has its origins in the ancient civil law. The statutory
remedy of multiple awards found in the following ancient systems represent the earliest precursors to
modem punitive damages theory: Code of Hammurabi, 2000 B.C.; Hittite Law, 1400 B.C.; Hindu
Code of Manu, 200 B.C. See generally G. DRIVER & J. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 500-01
(1952); K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(1) (1980).
The English common law proffered three justifications for the doctrine: (1) to justify otherwise
excessive jury verdicts, see Townsend v. Hughes, 86 Eng.Rep. 994 (C.P. 1649); (2) to cover noncom-
pensable injuries, especially ethereal injuries such as hurt feelings, humiliation, mental anguish and
embarrassment, see Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S.W. 351, 353 (1885) (citing
English scholars); and (3) to fill voids in criminal sanctions, see Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 381-97
(1873) (citing excerpts from numerous English judicial opinions). See generally Comment, Punitive
Damages Awards in Strict Products Liability Litigation: The Doctrine, the Debate, the Defenses, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 771, 774-76 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, Doctrine, Debate, Defenses].
The punitive damages doctrine has been sharply criticized. See Sales & Cole, supra note 5 (arguing
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on the criminal law, 126 and their great potential for abuse.1 27  Punish-
ment of the wrongdoer for past conduct and deterrence of similar future
conduct-both by the involved tortfeasor and others-form the modem
bases of punitive liability. 2 ' These dual rationales comport with the his-
torical development of the doctrine. State laws have predicated these
exemplary awards solely on the egregious conduct of the tortfeasor' 29
in favor of "relegating this legal dinosaur to an era that long since has passed"). See also Carsey, The
Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline, 11 FORUM 57 (1975); Duffy,
supra note 5 (calling for the abolition of the doctrine).
126. Punitive damages have been characterized as an anomaly in the civil law. As one court
queried:
How could the idea of punishment be deliberately and designedly installed as a doctrine of
civil remedies? Is not punishment out of place, irregular, anomalous, exceptional, unjust,
unscientific, not to say absurd, when classed among civil remedies? What kind of a civil
remedy for the plaintiff is the punishment of the defendant?
Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873). See also Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive
Damages Defendant, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 408 (1967). The principal concern of the critics is the
imposition of punishment without the procedural and constitutional safeguards of a criminal trial.
In rebuttal, commentators argue that the consequences of tort and criminal actions are not analo-
gous. For example, a civil trial results in no loss of liberty or stigma. Comment, Doctrine, Debate,
Defenses, supra note 125, at 780.
127. Juries have potentially limitless discretion in awarding punitive damages. Furthermore,
juries tend to be more sympathetic toward the innocent consumer than the large corporation with
the deep pocket. See generally Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1 (1982); Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised
by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REV. 573, 690-709 (1983). One commentator has proposed a
damage cap of either: (1) double the compensatory damages (analogous to antitrust trebel damages);
(2) litigation costs plus $10,000; or (3) a ceiling of $I million per plaintiff. Owen, Civil Punishment
and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 103, 119 (1982).
128. The majority of jurisdictions has adopted the dual rationales of punishment and deterrence.
J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.14, at 15-16 n.1 (1985)
(citing cases and statutes from 36 states and the District of Columbia). One state, Delaware, seeks
primarily to punish. See, eg., Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d 711, 714 (Del. 1972) ("Punitive or exem-
plary damages are allowed not by way of recompense for injury, but as punishment to the
tortfeasor.") (citation omitted). Some states also cite general deterrence as a primary goal. See, eg.,
Pringle Tax Serv., Inc. v. Knoblauch, 282 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Iowa 1979) ("Exemplary damages are
awarded as punishment and as a deterrent to the wrongdoer and others."); Newton v. Standard Fire
Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 113, 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1976) (punishment and deterrence are underlying
policies). Some states seek to deter both the specific tortfeasor and others. See, e.g., Kerr v. First
Commodity Corp. of Boston, 735 F.2d 281, 289 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying Missouri law); Frick v.
Abell, 198 Colo. 508, 511, 602 P.2d 852, 853 (1979). Other states seek to deter only the particular
tortfeasor. See, eg. Acheson v. Shafter, 107 Ariz. 576, 578, 490 P.2d 832, 834 (1971); National
Gypsum Co. v. Wammock, 256 Ga. 803, 353 S.E.2d 809 (1987).
129. The language used to describe such egregious conduct differs from state to state. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1990) (requiring oppression, fraud, or malice, express or
implied, for breach of noncontractual obligation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(a) (West Supp.
1990) (requiring willful, wanton, or gross misconduct); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West 1988)
(requiring "clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show a willful indifference
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and have not imposed punitive damages vicariously.1 3° Thus, the per-
sonal fault of the defendant represents the cornerstone of punitive
liability.
B. Punitive Damages and Products Liability
The entry of punitive damages into the realm of products liability has
engendered much debate. At first blush, the fault-based focus of punitive
damages appears directly to contradict the no-fault doctrine of strict lia-
bility. 131 Because of this apparent inconsistency, many courts invoking
the strict liability approach to impose compensatory damages have hesi-
tated to apply the same approach in the context of punitive damages. 132
This reluctance likely stems from the differing rationales underlying each
damage award. The primary goal of compensatory damages is to reim-
burse individuals for injuries; the primary objectives of punitive damages,
on the other hand, are to punish the wrongdoer and deter similar future
conduct. 133 The public policy of protecting innocent tort victims justifies
the awarding of compensatory damages regardless of fault. But award-
ing punitive damages without fault-as is impliedly the case with strict
liability-undermines the very objectives of the award.
Courts and commentators have proffered two theories that dispel this
apparent incompatibility. Under the first theory, fault is implicit in the
creation of a defective product.134 The culpability of the manufacturer
stems from its placing into the stream of commerce a product that fails to
meet applicable safety standards.1 35 The second theory recommends a
two-tiered inquiry. 136 Upon a finding of strict liability, the plaintiff may
make a supplementary showing of the conduct required to support an
to the rights or safety of others"); OR. REV. STAT. § 30-925(1) (1988) (requiring wanton disregard
for health, safety, and welfare of others).
130. In an agency relationship, however, a corporation may be held vicariously liable for the
wanton misconduct of all employees acting within the general scope of their employment. W. PROS-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984). A minority of jurisdictions has
adopted the complicity rule, which requires a showing that a high-level employee ordered, partici-
pated in, or ratified the misconduct. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21
OHIO ST. L.J. 216, 221 (1960).
131. See Comment, Doctrine, Debate, Defenses, supra note 125, at 781-82.
132. See infra note 138.
133. See infra note 173 and accompanying text (Brotherton court's justification of compensatory
and punitive damages).
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award of additional damages.' 37
C. Successor Corporation Liability for Punitive Damages
Despite some reservations,138 most jurisdictions have approved puni-
tive damages in the products liability context.139 Few courts, however,
have decided whether a successor corporation may be liable for punitive
damages. A recent series of cases involving the asbestos products of the
now-defunct Philip Carey Manufacturing Company constitutes the bulk
of litigation in this area.14  The identity of facts, 14 1 similar procedural
posture,142 and nationwide scope of these cases make this line of cases an
excellent vehicle for extrapolating the various state approaches to succes-
sor corporation liability for punitive damages.
Phillip Carey Manufacturing Company (Carey) had engaged in the
manufacturing and mining of various asbestos products from 1906 until
1970, when it ceased to exist pursuant to a merger agreement with Briggs
137. Id. See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (4th ed. 1971).
138. In Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967), Judge Friendly ex-
pressed three concerns regarding the imposition of punitive damages against a large drug manufac-
turer exposed to an unlimited number of claims. First, the court perceived the "gravest difficulty" in
managing such a multiplicity of suits to avoid overkill. Id. at 839. Courts and commentators have
proffered various solutions for this problem. See Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp.
357, 384-85, 387, 391, 396 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (allowing court to grant a request for remittitur);
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 282-84, 294 N.W.2d 437, 459-61 (1980) (allowing jury
to consider past and potential future liability); Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages
Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 52 (1982) (suggesting that jury
determine propriety of an award of punitive damages; amount to be left to judge's discretion).
Second, manufacturers ultimately will pass on the costs-whether resulting from high insurance
premiums or an actual damage award-to consumers in the form of increased price or decreased
quality. 378 F.2d at 841. But cf Comment, Doctrine, Debate, Defenses, supra note 125, at 784
(competitive market restrains manufacturer from passing on all costs).
Third, innocent shareholders are punished as a result of fewer earnings distributions or the de-
pressed market value of their stock. 378 F.2d at 841. In an extreme case, the shareholders may
suffer a total loss of investment if the company goes bankrupt. Most commentators consider this
result the risk inherent in investment and a means of encouraging shareholders to exercise greater
control. See Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 291, 294 N.W.2d at 453-54. But see Jones, Corporate Govern-
ance: Who Controls the Large Corporations?, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1261, 1263 (1979) (pointing out the
divorce of shareholder ownership from control and the marked trend toward management control).
139. See Comment, Doctrine, Debate, Defenses, supra note 125, at 793 (listing states that have
considered punitive damages awards in the strict liability context).
140. See infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
141. Unless otherwise noted, all cases discussed herein involve the acquisition described infra
notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
142. In each case, the defendant successor corporation raised either a motion in limine or a
motion for summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages. The denial of either motion merely
sends the issue to the jury; it does not assume an ultimate award of damages.
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Manufacturing Company (Briggs).'43 Prior to the merger, Carey pro-
duced insulation that led to plaintiffs' injuries.'44 Briggs succeeded to all
of Carey's assets and liabilities, changed its name to Panacon, and con-
tinued the roofing and insulation operations through a "Phillip Carey"
division.145 Shortly thereafter, the defendant, Celotex, purchased a ma-
jority of Panacon's stock for cash and then executed a cash-out merger in
order to obtain the remaining shares; Panacon ceased to exist. 46
Celotex's Phillip Carey division discontinued the manufacture of the
insulation products that injured plaintiffs. However, it distributed the
remaining line of such products under the same brand name with warn-
ing labels attached.147 Celotex retained some of Panacon's employees,
including at least one officer. 141 Plaintiffs sought punitive damages from
Celotex, basing their claim on the predecessor's failure to reveal knowl-
edge of the health risks posed by exposure to asbestos.' 49
Given the disagreement over the appropriate test for compensatory
damages, 5 ' it is not surprising that the results reached by different fo-
rums in these cases vary with respect to punitive damages as well. First,
two fundamentally different viewpoints have emerged with respect to the
treatment of statutory mergers such as the one in question.' 5 ' In addi-
tion, although some courts have agreed on the inappropriateness of the
product-line theory in the context of punitive damages,152 they have
reached no consensus regarding the proper application of a continuity-of-
enterprise or identity test.53
L Statutory Merger
One approach, applied by the Supreme Court of Florida in Celotex
Corp. v. Picket,'54 views a statutory merger as the vehicle for imposing
both compensatory and punitive damages. 155 In Picket, the court held
143. See, eg., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. 818, 820 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
144. See, e.g., id. at 820.
145. Id.
146. For a definition of a cash-out merger, see supra note 12.
147. Sheppard v. A.C. & S. Co., 484 A.2d 521, 524 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984).
148. Id. at 524.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
154. 490 So. 2d 35, 38 (Fla. 1986).
155. See also Marks v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1429, 232 Cal. Rptr.
[Vol. 68:339
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that a successor may be liable for punitive damages whenever its succes-
sorship is the product of a statutory merger.156 The court reasoned that,
following a merger, the surviving entity "cannot . . . disclaim its
lineage."1 57
The Picket court found no justification for treating punitive damages
liability differently from any other contingent liability.l15 Moreover, the
court contended that its decision fulfilled the two primary goals of puni-
tive damages-punishment and deterrence. 59 According to the court,
such a rule punishes the "present [legal] embodiment" of the entity
whose conduct gave rise to the injury."6 The threat of punitive damages
also deters potential buyers from seeking to acquire companies that have
engaged in reckless behavior, forcing acquisition candidates to behave
according to acceptable standards.161
2. Two-Step Approach
In contrast to the Picket court's statutory merger approach, the Supe-
rior Court of New Jersey adopted a two-step approach in Brotherton v.
Celotex Corp. 162 Under this test, the finding of a statutory merger merely
satisfies a necessary predicate for the imposition of punitive damages; it
does not alone impose liability. 163 An independent test-either the con-
594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (transfer of liabilities includes punitive damages where all indicia of merger
are present).
156. Accord Duca v. Raymark Indus., No. 84-0587, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 1986) (statu-
tory merger transfers liability for punitives, even absent continuity of ownership or management);
Krull v. Celotex Corp., 611 F. Supp. 146, 148-49 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (defendant who failed to note
fundamental difference between merger and asset purchase is responsible for liability resulting from
merger); Hanlon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 599 F. Supp. 376, 378 (N.D. Iowa 1984).
157. Pickett, 490 So. 2d at 38.
158. Id. at 37-38.
159. Id. at 38.
160. Id.
161. Id. Thus, the court was concerned with deterring only the individual tortfeasor and not
similarly situated companies. The court analogized the role of the potential buyer in monitoring
corporate conduct to that of the shareholders. The court's position, however, appears rather tenu-
ous. It is doubtful that the threat of successor liability will have a very strong impact at the time of
manufacture, as the potential buyer might not even have contemplated acquisition or the manufac-
turer a sale. Furthermore, neither the predecessor nor a potential buyer may learn of a potential
defect until long after the acquisiton. Most courts prefer to premise liability on general deterrence.
See supra note 128.
162. 202 N.J. Super. 148, 493 A.2d 1337 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
163. Id. at 155, 493 A.2d at 1340. The court did not state this position explicitly; however, the
court's reasoning supports this interpretation. The court first stated that a statutory merger is suffi-
cient to transfer all obligations of the predecessor. However, the court devoted most of its opinion to
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tinuity-of-enterprise or the product-line theory-then determines
whether punitive damages are appropriate.", Under the Brotherton
court's two-step approach, therefore, a statutory merger provides a
sound basis for compensatory liability, but serves only as a prerequisite
for an award of punitive damages under traditional tort principles. 165
a. Continuity of Enterprise
Courts employing the two-step test of Brotherton almost uniformly
have rejected the Alad product-line theory166 in favor of the continuity-
of-enterprise theory for determining the propriety of punitive dam-
ages.167  In In re Related Asbestos Cases,'61 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California concluded that "the justifi-
cations underlying successor liability for compensatory damages articu-
lated in Ray v. Alad simply are not present [when punitive damages are
sought]."' 169 In particular, the court noted the possibility of a windfall to
the plaintiff, 70 the potential depletion of the successor's assets,, 7 and the
successor's inability to assume a risk-spreading role.1'7 The continuity
discussing the "appropriateness of punitive damages," concluding that "punitive damages [are] not
appropriate in all situations where compensatory damages [are] awarded .. " Id. at 156, 493 A.2d
at 1341. This language indicates that a statutory merger transfers merely compensatory liability to a
successor, thus making punitive damages available. A different test then determines whether puni-
tive damages are appropriate. See infra notes 164-86 and accompanying text.
164. Brotherton, 202 N.J. Super. at 157-59, 493 A.2d at 1342-43.
165. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
166. One court has accepted the product-line theory in the punitive damages context. See Oli-
ver v. GAF Corp., No. 83-4208, slip. op. (E.D. Pa. July 17, 1985). A few courts afford special
treatment to the statutory merger. See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Duca v. Raymark Indus., No. 84-0587, slip op. at 6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 1986); In re
Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Calif. 1983); Brotherton v. Celotex, 202 N.J. Super.
148, 156, 493 A.2d 1337, 1341 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985); Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 322
Pa. Super. 348, 469 A.2d 655 (1983). Interestingly, all of these states-New Jersey, Pennsylvania
and California-have adopted the Alad product-line theory in the compensatory damages context.
See supra notes 102-04.
168. 566 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
169. Id. at 822.
170. Id. Because the plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages as a matter of right, he arguably
reaps a windfall to the extent that his recovery exceeds the actual harm suffered. K. REDDEN,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 3.4(A) (1980). Justifying this windfall, some commentators view punitive
damages as a means of compensating the plaintiff for attorney's fees. Because the first plaintiff takes
the greatest risks and incurs the highest transaction costs, he arguably deserves an increased award.
See Comment, Doctrine, Debate, Defenses, supra note 125, at 786.
171. 566 F. Supp. at 822. Large awards to initial plaintiffs could deplete assets of the successor
and deprive future claimants of compensatory damages to which they are entitled.
172. Id. With respect to compensatory damages, the predecessor and successor are in virtually
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theory, on the other hand, better comports with the primary goals of
punitive damages by focusing on the identity of the two corporations.' 73
b. Continuity of Personnel
Courts adhering to the line of reasoning in Asbestos Cases purport to
apply the Turner test174 in the punitive damages context. 175  Several
courts, however, have significantly altered the test by focusing almost
exclusively on one factor-the continuity of personnel. 176 In Brotherton,
for example, the court found that evidence of the existence of one com-
mon employee with personal knowledge of the predecessor's potential
liability was sufficient to defeat the successor corporation's motion for
summary judgment. 177  Similarly, the Asbestos Cases court rejected the
the same position to spread the risk by obtaining insurance or passing the costs on to consumers.
See supra note 97. However, the successor will be unable to obtain insurance coverage for punitive
damages in the majority ofjurisdictions. In these jurisdictions, public policy dictates that the wrong-
doer should not be able to insure against wrongful acts that merit exemplary awards. See Dorsey v.
Continental Casualty Co., 730 F.2d 675 (11th Cir. 1984); Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. McNulty,
307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); City of Prods. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Brown v. Westen Casualty & Ins. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App.
1971); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. United States Concrete Pipe Co., 369 So. 2d 451 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Guaranty Abstract & Title Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 228 Kan.
532, 618 P.2d 1195 (1980).
Courts in other jurisdictions allow insurance coverage by refusing to interject public policy con-
cerns into a private contract between the insured and insurer. See, eg., Price v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972); First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity Ins. &
Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359 (1978); Anthony v. Frith, 394 So. 2d 867 (Miss. 1981);
Harrell v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977); Lazenby v. Universal Under-
writers Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 168 W. Va. 172, 283
S.E.2d 227 (1981).
173. The Brotherion opinion concluded that the distinct purposes of the two theories allow them
to operate coextensively:
The product line theory is designed to liberalize recovery for plaintiffs left remediless
against a defunct corporation. This aim is consistent with the rationale behind compensa-
tory damages, which is to reimburse individuals for losses sustained .... The continuation
test fulfills a different function. This test allows punitive damages to be assessed against a
successor where it shares certain similarities with its predecessor. By creating an identity
requirement, the continuation test furthers the primary objectives of punitive damages, i.e.,
punishment of the wrongdoer and deterrence of similar conduct in the future.
202 N.J. Super. at 158-59, 493 A.2d at 1342 (citations omitted).
174. See supra notes 58-80.
175. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Celotex Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 148, 493 A.2d 1337 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1985).
176. In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. 818, 823-24 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Brotherton v.
Celotex Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 148, 160, 493 A.2d 1337, 1342-43 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985);
Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 322 Pa. Super. 348, 370-72, 469 A.2d 655, 666-67 (1983).
177. 202 N.J. Super. at 159-60, 493 A.2d at 1342-43. The court distinguished Asbestos Cases, in
which a U.S. district court held that plaintiff's allegation that Lewis Pechstein, a former employee of
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plaintiff's mere continuation theory in the absence of a showing that the
successor continued to employ culpable and responsible officers of the
predecessor. 17 8 Critics argue that an approach that focuses on continuity
of personnel ignores the nature of a corporation as a separate legal
entity. 179
c. Successor's Conduct as a Defense
One court has suggested another alteration of the traditional compen-
satory damages test by recognizing the successor corporation's conduct
as either a complete defense or a mitigating factor. The Sixth Circuit in
Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp.'o first recognized the possibility of a
defense based on a change in corporate ownership.s In that case, the
plaintiff brought an action seeking damages for injuries caused by the
successor corporation's liquid drain cleaner.' 8 2 The court reasoned that
improving industry practices negated the deterrent function of punitive
damages.18 3 Furthermore, the new management had purged itself of pre-
existing misconduct, thus eliminating the punitive function of exemplary
damages. 1
8 4
Other courts have taken a successor's conduct into account by finding
that the successor corporation has an independbnt duty to warn.18 5 Nev-
Carey, was elected secretary of Celotex did not create a genuine issue of material fact on the identity
issue. See Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. at 823. In Brotherton, however, plaintiff proffered additional
evidence linking Pechstein to the culpable conduct. Pechstein had hired Dr. Mancuso, a medical
consultant, to advise the company on the relationship between asbestos and cancer. Brotherton, 202
N.J. Super. at 160, 493 A.2d at 1343. Pechstein discharged Mancuso after receiving findings unfa-
vorable to the company. Id.
178. Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. at 823. Another court has suggested that the "quality, as well
as quantity" of overlapping personnel might play an integral role in the analysis. Martin v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 322 Pa. Super. 348, 372 n.22, 469 A.2d 655, 667 n.22 (1983).
179. Duca v. Raymark Indus., No. 84-0587, slip. op. at 4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 1986). That court
noted that, even in the absence of an acquisition, the same corporate personnel who made the deci-
sions at the time of exposure most likely were not still with the company, or even alive, at the time of
suit, given the lag time between exposure and litigation. Id. Moreover, the Duca court reasoned,
liability fulfills the primary goal of punitive damages-general deterrence-regardless of changes in
personnel within the offending corporation. Id. But see Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d
352, 353, 365 (6th Cir. 1978) (punishment is primary goal of punitive damages, general deterrence is
secondary).
180. 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978).




185. In dictum, the court in Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981),
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ertheless, courts disagree with respect to the role that a successor's con-
duct should play.'86
IV. PROPOSAL
A few courts purportedly have settled the issue of punitive damages
against a successor corporation for products liability.' 87 These courts es-
sentially have presumed the propriety of punitive damages under the cir-
cumstances by focusing solely on the determination of which test should
apply.' In doing so, they have effectively circumvented the central
question: Are punitive damages in fact appropriate in this context? A
second fundamental flaw in this line of cases is the assumption that the
court must choose between either the product-line or continuity-of-enter-
prise theory.1
8 9
The courts properly have concluded that the product-line theory does
not justify the imposition of punitive damages.190 Three of the four tradi-
tional justifications for strict liability are not implicated in the punitive
damages context.' 91  The fourth-the greater ability to absorb the
also alluded to an independent ground of liability arising from a duty to update the product and
warn of known dangers. Id. at 369, 431 A.2d at 832. Other courts have suggested a possible duty to
warn in dictum as well. The mere continuation of the predecessor's name and the acquisition of
goodwill will not, standing alone, give rise to a duty. Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 448 (7th
Cir. 1977). Factors to consider include: succession to service contracts, coverage of a particular
machine under service contract, knowledge of the defects, and knowledge of the location of the
owner or machine. Id. at 449. See also Leannais v. Cincinnatti, 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977). Thus,
the duty stems from the establishment of a relationship between the successor and the customers of
the predecessor, rather than the nexus between the two entities. Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d
75, 84 (3d Cir. 1986); Monzingo v. Corrett Mfg. Co., 752 F.2d 168, 177 & n.12 (5th Cir. 1985).
186. Compare In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. 818, 824 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (citing lack
of evidence that defendant perpetuated the conduct in denying punitive damages) with Martin v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 322 Pa. Super. 348, 372, 469 A.2d 655, 667 (1983) (fact that successor does
not continue product line or cures defect does not exonerate it). One commentator would allow the
acquisition alone to mitigate the amount of any damages award. See Comment, Doctrine, Debate,
Defenses, supra note 125, at 790-92 (corporate acquisition can be used to mitigate amount of award
only and should not be a per se defense).
187. See supra notes 155, 162.
188. See supra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
189. In Duca, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania per-
ceived this problem: "The parties have briefed the issue as though we must choose between the
product-line test.., and the degree of identity test .... We disagree." Duca v. Raymark Indus.,
No. 84-0587, slip. op. at 5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 1986) (citations omitted). This proposal resolves the
problem by adopting a test that does not distinguish between the different tests for finding compensa-
tory liability in successor products liability cases. See infra notes 200-17 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (punitive damage justifications). The successor
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costs-does not alone provide a sufficient basis for imposing exemplary
damages. Unlike compensatory damages, the primary goal of exemplary
damages is to punish and deter, not to compensate the victim.
As a result, most courts have focused on the continuity-of-enterprise
test, as did the court in Brotherton.'92 While the continuity-of-enterprise
theory may better comport with punitive damages than the product-line
theory, 93 its policy justifications also begin to deteriorate in the punitive
damages context. First, the argument that the successor has deprived the
tort claimant of his remedy against the original manufacturer' 94 loses
strength once the plaintiff has collected compensatory damages. Second,
some courts treat the acquisition as a contract, deciding that the pur-
chaser who receives the benefits of a going concern also must bear its
burdens.1 9 While manufacturers should anticipate compensatory dam-
ages for products liability in the ordinary course of business, punitive
damages-premised on unknown conduct of the predecessor-arguably
extend beyond the scope of the bargained-for agreement. 196
The continuity theory' 97 is also inapposite in the punitive damages
context for some of the same reasons that invalidate the product-line the-
did not place the defective product in the stream of commerce, nor did it impliedly represent the
product's safety. Both of these actions occurred at the point of manufacture. One could argue that
the third justification-the ability to improve the product or cure the defect-applies equally to the
successor and the predecessor. A necessary predicate, however, is that the successor must first be
put on notice of the defect before this duty is triggered. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.
App. 3d 757, 813, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (noting manuacturer's knowledge of
the defect as an element of punitive damages finding in products liability).
192. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. Some critics might argue that the successor
deprived the plaintiff of his sole remedy by causing the dissolution, and that this deprivation consti-
tutes sufficient "fault" to incur punitive damages. Cf Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp.,
506 F.2d 361, 369-70 (1974) (describing successor's causation of predecessor dissolution in culpatory
language). Even accepting this reasoning arguendo, a court should recall that the purpose of puni-
tive damages in tort liability is to punish the defendant for malfeasance that causes the injury, not for
wrongdoing that denies the remedy.
195. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
196. To ignore this distinction is to argue that the successor-to-be must take unknown, and likely
hidden, malfeasance by the predecessor into account during bargaining. But cf Celotex Corp. v.
Picket, 490 So. 2d 35, 38 (Fla. 1986), supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (treating damages
as any other contingent liability).
197. Courts imposing punitive liability do not state clearly whether they are relying on the tradi-
tional corporate rule, see supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text, or the expanded Turner ap-
proach, see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. However, because they do not focus on the
commonality of shareholder interests, these courts implicitly adopt the Turner rule. See, e.g., Broth-
erton v. Celotex Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 148, 493 A.2d 1337 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
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ory. Because the notion of fault is critical to a finding of punitive liabil-
ity, courts must not forget that principles of strict liability form the
undergirdings of both theories.198 Furthermore, the nexus between the
predecessor and the successor required by the continuity theory1 99 essen-
tially serves the same purpose as the successor's continuation of a prod-
uct line for the purposes of punitive damages: providing evidence of
knowledge of the alleged misconduct. Neither test alone, therefore, pro-
vides the requisite degree of fault for punitive liability.
Brotherton and its progeny have taken a step in the right direction by
requiring a two-step inquiry.2' A de jure or de facto merger2" 1 serves
the same function in the corporate law as a finding of strict liability in
tort law. Mergers present sufficient policy grounds to confer compensa-
tory liability as a matter of law, with no further culpability require-
ment.2 °2 Similarly, strict liability automatically imposes liability without
a finding of fault.2 °3 Neither theory alone suggests a proper basis for
imposing successor punitive damages liability.
The Brotherton holding represents only a start, however; the adopted
test contains a problem in each of its two steps. In the first step, the
court specifically required a statutory merger to invoke succession of pu-
nitive damages. 4 Yet many courts have already decided that successor
liability can follow from de facto mergers or other continuity princi-
ples.20 5 Little differentiates the statutory from the de facto merger that
would affect the assessment of punitive damages.2" 6
198. Cf supra notes 74-78, 94-100. Courts should look beyond the "corporate" and "tort" labels
attached to the two theories. Instead, they must recognize the need for an extra step, one that
involves some element of fault.
199. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
201. The Brotherton court actually required a de jure, or statutory, merger. However, this pro-
posal will argue that the distinction between de jure and de facto mergers has no relevance to the
punitive damages inquiry. See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
202. That a merger saddles the successor with ordinary debt liability of the predecessor seems
hardly open to question. Otherwise, a company could eliminate any debt simply by merging with
another company. Compensatory damage liability based on strict product liability presents a
tougher question--due to the successor's freedom from even the implied culpability inherent in plac-
ing the product in the market. Nevertheless, courts generally have found that sufficient benefit flows
to the successor from the predecessor's market exploitation to justify the imposition of successor
liability here as well. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 131.
204. Brotherton v. Celotex, 202 N.J. Super. 148, 154-55, 493 A.2d 1337, 1340 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1985).
205. See supra notes 24-80 and accompanying text.
206. The Brotherton court suggested the one potential distinction: "By executing [this statutory
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The Brotherton second step fails in addressing only further aspects of
similarity between the predecessor and the successor. It improperly fo-
cuses on the continuity of culpable personnel.2 07 Although this require-
ment strives to fulfill the punishment and deterrent functions of punitive
damages,2 °8 it ignores the true legal nature of the corporate entity, as
exacerbated by the inevitable lag time that typifies products liability liti-
gation.20 9 Courts instead should require a supplemental showing of ag-
gravating conduct in order to justify punitive damages in either case.210
The essence of the successor liability problem is that one of two inno-
cent parties must bear costs of a harmful product manufactured by a
wrongdoer who no longer exists. While public policy mandates a bend-
ing of the rigid corporate rule in order to compensate innocent tort vic-
tims adequately, the rationales behind the exceptions fail to justify the
imposition of punitive liability.21   Because a successor corporation de-
rives liability from the pre-acquisition conduct of its predecessor, succes-
sorship should not serve as the sole basis for exemplary damages.
Rather, courts should premise liability on the successor's postacquisi-
tion conduct. The imposition of punitive damages on a successor corpo-
ration should require evidence that the successor perpetuated the
predecessor's misconduct. Alternatively, courts should impose liability
when a successor had actual knowledge of a defect, 212 but concealed it
rather than curing it or issuing a warning. To the extent that the succes-
sor-predecessor relationship is a source of such knowledge, it is relevant
to a finding of liability. The proposed theory, however, emphasizes the
relationship between the successor corporation and its predecessor's cus-
tomers.21 3 Thus, evidence establishing a link between the successor and
merger, the successor] became statutorily bound to absorb all the liabilities of [the predecessor],
including any potential claims for punitive damages." 202 N.J. Super at 154, 493 A.2d at 1339.
That court nonetheless did not find the distinction sufficient; if it had, it would have needed no
second test of continuity. It must have assumed that even the statutory requirement of assuming
liabilities did not include punitive product liabilities.
207. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
208. Most courts justify liability on the basis of general deterrence. See supra notes 127, 178 and
accompanying text. Thus, there is arguably no need for continuity between the enterprises because
the primary tortfeasor is not the party the court seeks to deter.
209. See supra notes 10, 142 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text (understanding of fault in simple products
liability punitive damages cases).
211. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 185-86.
213. Because the focus is no longer on the nexus between the selling and buying corporation, the
mere continuation of the business and acquisition of goodwill will not suffice for punitive damages
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the predecessor's customers is significant. Such indicia may include:
honoring warranties; assuming service contracts, particularly with re-
spect to the defective product; using the predecessor's customer lists to
market the same or similar products; and failing to warn a known cus-
tomer of a danger.2t 4
A theory focusing on the successor's "culpability" would have led to
substantially different results than under the product-line and continuity
theories. For example, a successor that purges itself of the predecessor's
misconduct will not incur punitive liability even though it continues the
same product line. Alternatively, a successor that discontinues the prod-
uct still may incur liability for intentionally concealing the predecessor's
wrongdoing.215 Furthermore, the mere fact that an acquisition meets the
requirements of the continuity theory will not suffice. Under the facts of
Brotherton,z t6 the defendant would have been exonerated, despite the
overlap of culpable personnel, because it sold the predecessor's product
with a warning label attached.
A further benefit accrues from this culpability inquiry: it dispenses
with Brotherton's restrictive first step.21 7 Courts should be less reluctant
to assess punitive damages to any successor entity from whom successor
compensatory damages are available when an extra culpability require-
ment is added. This movement in turn will eliminate the statutory
merger anomaly from Brotherton's first step.
By shifting the focus of the inquiry to the fault of the successor, rather
than to some derivative test, this proposal accommodates the corporate
law's quest for certainty. Furthermore, it comports with traditional tort
principles and the goals of punitive damages.
Deborah E. Bielicke
liability. See supra note 86. This theory would, for example, alter the result in Rawlings v. D.M.
Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). See supra notes 89-91
and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
215. The proposal would impose liability in such a case given the existence of other elements
leading to a finding of compensatory damage liability. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying
text.
216. Brotherton v. Celotex, 202 N.J. Super. 148, 493 A.2d 1337 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
See supra notes 143-49, 162-65, and accompanying text.
217. The Brotherton court's first step required a formal statutory merger. This proposal criti-
cizes such a strict test. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
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